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BROWNFIELDS AND BRAC: A SURPRISING 
"COMPATIBILITY'' 
JOEL B. EISEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of the Symposium that generated these articles, 
"Mission Impossible?: The Compatibility of Military and Environmental 
Goals," enticed attendees to witness a train wreck-like clash of ideals. 
Environmentalists, frustrated by what they see as the military's poor 
environmental record, would have a chance to blast their foes. Represen-
tatives from the Air Force, Army, and Navy would respond by touting 
their improvements in complying with environmental laws, and their 
initiatives to become more green, such as increasing use ofrenewable fuels 
in aircraft fleets. The day promised to be as entertaining as roller derby, 
or for a more contemporary audience, ultimate fighting. 
The two panels before ours did not disappoint. Thomas Ledvina, 
the U.S. Navy's Associate General Counsel for Litigation, and Joel 
Reynolds, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, offered sharply 
contrasting perspectives on the Navy's use of sonar and its impact on 
marine mammals. Professor Robert Percival's presentation on" American 
Exceptionalism" took the military to task for crafting out exceptions for 
itself from environmental laws, and Professor Marcilynn Burke high-
lighted the need to protect national treasures from military encroachment. 
And then Carolyn White and I stepped up to the plate. Of all the 
day's panels, ours was perhaps the one that most demonstrated that 
military and civilian environmental goals can be compatible. Indeed, we 
found ourselves in a harmonious position, which made for little debate 
and few questions from an audience primed from the morning's panels 
to expect confrontation. That was no accident. The Base Realignment 
and Closure ("BRAC") process was a major focus of Ms. White's presenta-
tion on environmental issues, involving a wide variety of military real 
•Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank the 
participants and attendees at the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy 
Review's Symposium, "Mission Impossible?: The Compatibility of Military and 
Environmental Goals," the editors of the Environmental Law and Policy Review, Carolyn 
White for her assistance and helpful suggestions, and Clay Burns for research assistance. 
403 
404 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL 'y REV. [Vol. 32:403 
property transactions (not just those in BRAC), and the central theme of 
mine. Ms. White and I have studied BRAC from somewhat different 
perspectives. I have looked at BRAC from an academic, theoretical per-
spective, comparing BRAC's environmental features to those of state and 
federal brownfields programs and incentives. Ms. White has extensive 
transactional expertise involving military real estate, including frontline 
responsibilities in the BRAC program. 
Both of us suggested strongly that lessons learned from the BRAC 
process over the past decade turn out to be surprisingly useful not only 
in assessing how the military should remediate sites before transferring 
them, but also in discussing how the private sector should remediate and 
reuse real property. This broad agreement between us about BRAC's 
features and track record made for a comfortable Saturday afternoon, of 
course. But it led to an even more positive outcome. 
In the symposium presentations, Q&A sessions, and discussions 
afterwards, I found a common ground in our different but complementary 
approaches to environmental issues in property remediation and reuse. 
Specifically, I found that the BRAC process, far from being inattentive 
to environmental concerns in the process of closing surplus bases and 
transferring them to the private sector, has three "surprises," some of which 
are positive. Each of these relate directly to one of the areas of main con-
cern that I have expressed in the past about state voluntary cleanup prog-
rams: public participation, cleanup standards, and cleanup procedures. 
In Part I of this Article, I describe the BRAC process and compare 
it to the process for remediating abandoned or underused sites in state 
brownfields programs. I find that while the two systems are different in 
many significant respects, these differences do not overwhelm the com-
monalities inherent in comparing two systems that focus on remediating 
sites and transferring them to their new owners. In Part II, I describe the 
environmental remediation process of BRAC and positive "surprises" in 
terms of the statutory preference for finality in remedial actions and for 
public participation at sites being closed and the more mixed impact of 
the evolution ofBRAC to become more "brownfields-like." 
I. COMPARING BRAC AND BROWNFIELDS PROCESSES 
A. The BRAC Process 
BRAC is the well known, high-profile effort where military 
facilities deemed surplus are being closed ("C") or functionally realigned 
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("R") by the Department of Defense ("DoD''). There have been five waves 
(or "rounds," in military-speak) of BRAC: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 
2005. Nearly four hundred installations have been closed or realigned 
since 1988, and the 2005 BRAC round is the most aggressive ever, con-
templating the closing of twenty-two major military installations in a 
process lasting at least until the year 2011.1 Congressional enactments 
governing the BRAC process include the Base Closure and Realignment 
Act of 1988 (governing the BRAC 1988 round),2 the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Act of 1990 (BRAC 1991, 1993, and 1995),3 and the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 and the subsequent BRAC 
Commission report (BRAC 2005).4 
A BRAC site can be the size of a small town or even larger: the 
SouthField base in Massachusetts was once described as "bigger than 
Boston";5 the Oakland Army Base occupied 364 acres in a dense urban set-
ting.6 The proposed closure of such facilities would have serious impacts on 
local economies,7 not to mention the political future of elected officials 
who dared to support closures.8 For this reason, BRAC Congressional 
1 Donna Miles, BRAC Deadline Expires, DoD to Begin Closures, Realignments, AMER. 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 2005, available at www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
newsarticle.aspx? .id= 18352. 
2 Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 2749, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988). 
3 Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2901, 104 Stat. 1808 (1990); see also James W. Moeller, Arsenic 
and an Old Base: Legal Issues Associated with the Environmental Restoration of Defense 
Sites in Washington, D.C., Used for the Development and Disposal of World War I 
Chemical Munitions, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 879, 894-96 (2005) (citations omitted). 
4 Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1012 (2001); DEF. BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENTCOMM'N, 
FINALREPORTTO THE PRESIDENT (2005), available at http://www.brac.gov/ finalreport.html. 
5 See David Hall, Senior Vice President, LNR Property Corp., Southfield: Redevelopment 
of Former Na val Air Station South Weymouth, Remarks at Brownfields 2006 Conference: 
Military Base Redevelopment: General and Major Issues, Strategies, and Successes 
(Power Point presentation available at http://www.brownfields2008.org/proxy/Session 
Document.184 7 .aspx). 
6 California Department of Toxic Substances Control, Envirostor, Oakland Army Base, 
www.envirostor.dtsc.ca.gov/public/profile_report.asp?global_id=01970006 (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2008). 
7 Base Closure and Community Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2901(2), 107 Stat. 
1907 (1994) ("A military installation is a significant source of employment for many 
communities, and the closure or realignment of an installation may cause economic 
hardship for such communities."); see also INTERSTATE TECH. & REGULATORY COUNCIL, 
PROPERTY REVITALIZATION-LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRAC AND BROWNFIELDS 25, 26 
(2006) [hereinafter ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED], available at http://www.itrcweb.org/ 
Documents/Brnfld_2web. pdf. 
8 Childs Walker, Lawmakers Encourage Support for Base Plan, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 
2005, available at www.baltimoresun.com/news/local/brac/bal-md.base24May24 ;O, 7886244 
.story?coll=bal_news_local_brac_xpromo. 
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enactments are the product of more horse-trading than perhaps any 
other legislation save for appropriations bills. To bring independence to 
the process, Congress created a mechanism that was intended to de-
politicize the process by way of transferring base closing decisions to 
independent commissions. 9 Of course, there are plenty who would argue 
that the resulting decisions are still heavily influenced by politics and 
not those of an independent process that examines each individual base 
closing on its own merits. 
The process by which a particular base makes it onto the BRAC 
list, however, is not the focus of this Article, which takes it as a given 
that a base has been selected for closure and transfer. Once that decision 
has taken place, a rigorous multi-step process must be followed, in-
cluding an environmental remediation "track" governed by a variety of 
Executive Orders and federal agency documents that interpret and guide 
cleanups. As noted more fully below, cleanups at BRAC sites must follow 
the mandates of state and federal environmental laws, including the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act ("CERCLA"), the Clean Water Act ("CW A"), the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"), among others.10 
The DoD's involvement in addressing environmental contamina-
tion at its facilities predates BRAC. In 1986, the Defense Environmental 
Restoration Program ("DERP") was created for this purpose.11 Since 
then, nearly 30,000 sites have been identified for investigation and pos-
sible remediation activities. 12 BRAC cleanups are but one aspect of the 
DERP but a major one, responsible for about $300 to $600 million in 
annual appropriations. 13 
9 Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 201, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627 (1988) (establishing the Commission 
on Base Realignment and Closure). 
10 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BASE REDEVELOPMENT AND REALIGNMENT MANuAL 
(2006) [hereinafter BRRM], available athttp://www.defenselink.mil/bradpdf/ 4165-66-M-
BRRM-508. pdf. 
11 U.S. Department ofDefense, History of the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, 
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/PublidLibrary/Cleanup/CleanupOfdderp/history.htmlOast 
visited Jan. 10, 2008); see also Moeller, supra note 3, at 886-93 (citations omitted). 
12 Moeller, supra note 3, at 902. 
13 DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
APPENDIXB:COMPONENTENVIRONMENTALPROGRAMSPROGRESS:ARMY,NAVY,AlRFORCE, 
DLA, FUDS, available at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Publir/News/OSD/DEP2005/ 
appB-component-program.pdf. 
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In 2006, the DoD issued a "Base Redevelopment and Realignment 
Manual" ("BRRM"), a 146-page "cookbook" that prescribes BRAC pro-
cedures, including environmental remediation procedures.14 A central 
body in the BRAC process is the Local Redevelopment Authority ("LRA"), 
an entity established by a state or local government, and recognized by 
the DoD as responsible for developing the site's redevelopment plan and 
potentially having a role in its implementation. 15 The LRA "serves as the 
primary link between DoD and the installation and the community and 
Federal and State agencies for all base closure matters."16 The LRA's 
reuse plan for the site to be transferred is intended to be a "reasonably 
anticipated future land use ... taking into account factors such as the 
current land use, zoning classifications and restrictions, property 
characteristics, and surrounding land areas."17 The site's future use, as 
identified in the redevelopment plan, in turn helps with the identifica-
tion of the required cleanup level. 
The method of disposing of BRAC surplus property is deter-
mined between the DoD and the LRA and can take one of many forms 
listed in the BRRM "toolbox": public benefit conveyance, economic 
development conveyance, public sale, negotiated sale, homeless assistance 
conveyance under the McKinney Act, or an "environmental responsibili-
ties conveyance," which is an outright conveyance for the cost of 
environmental remediation. 18 
B. Differences Between BRAC and Brownfields Process 
Forty-nine states have programs to promote revitalization of 
''brownfields": "real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of 
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a 
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."19 Many factors have 
14 See generally BRRM, supra note 10. 
15 
"After redevelopment planning activities are completed, the LRA submits its adopted 
redevelopment plan to the Military Department." Id. § C2.5.l. 
16 Id. § 3.2.2. 
17 AsS'N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS, A REGULATOR'S GUIDE 
TO BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 13 (2006) [hereinafter ASTSWMO, BRAC 
REGULATOR'S GUIDE], available at http://www.astswmo.org/files/publications/federal 
facilities/Final-BRAC-Guide. pdf. 
18 BRRM, supra note 10, §§ C2.6, C5.5. 
19 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, § 211, 115 Stat. 2356, 2361 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2000 
& Supp. IV 2004)). 
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fueled an explosion in the number and size ofbrownfields programs over 
the past two decades, including (at the outset in part) a response to the 
fear of potential owner/operator liability under CERCLA and its state 
counterparts for becoming associated with sites and a prevalent desire 
to shift the enforcement model of environmental protection to being more 
accommodating to those who sought to redevelop abandoned or neglected 
sites. Today, many states have "voluntary cleanup programs" ("VCPs") 
that allow site developers, who are usually not responsible for any 
contamination at the site, to come voluntarily to the states and conduct 
cleanups, receiving liability protection in return. Because state VCPs aim 
to remediate sites with a more streamlined process, the cleanup is 
typically meant to take less time and have fewer steps than the NCP 
cleanup process.20 
State brownfields programs have successfully processed thou-
sands of brownfields sites, and there are numerous high-profile stories 
involving the conversion of abandoned or underused sites in urban, rural 
and suburban locations to productive uses.21 At the federal level, one 
commentator views the 2002 law promoting brownfields reuse and 
remediation as a positive "exception" to the dismaying recent trend of 
congressional inaction on environmental issues.22 
Brownfields sites are typically different from BRAC sites, which 
are identified as surplus in the BRAC process directed by the scheme 
implemented by Congress. The highly politicized BRAC process yields a 
prescribed list of sites that become identified for closure and transfer to 
private sector entities. By contrast, some brownfields sites are identified 
through centralized processes such as inventories (for example, the New 
Jersey SiteMart),23 but usually the site buyer, developer, or local govern-
ment identifies the site. BRAC sites are, by definition, always owned by 
the federal government and have usually had multiple uses as military 
uses of a base changed.24 Often the owner of a brownfields site is not 
known; in many cases there is no current owner (like "orphan sites" in 
CERCLA parlance) and cleanup and transfer responsibility may fall to 
20 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 25-26. 
21 See generally Joel B. Eisen, Brown/folds at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 721 (2007) [hereinafter Eisen, Brownfi,elds at 20). 
22 Richard Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 629 (2006). 
23 State of New Jersey, Brownfields Site Mart, http://www.njsitemart.com (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2008); see also Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 729. 
24 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 64. 
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a local government.25 In the case of both types of sites, though, there is 
one similarity in that historical records are often incomplete.26 
The level and types of contaminants are also typically different. 
Contamination at BRAC sites depends on how the military used the 
sites and can include such widely diverse and dangerous substances as 
metals, chlorinated solvents, organic chemicals, unexploded ordnance, 
and even radioactive wastes.27 Contamination of soil, groundwater, 
surface water, and sediments may be so widespread and severe that the 
site may be listed on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). By contrast, 
under state VCP restrictions, sites typically are not extensively contami-
nated and usually cannot be listed on the NPL or comparable state 
enforcement site lists.28 
Another difference between the two programs is in the level and 
type of regulatory oversight. One commentator observes that "the regu-
latory oversight process at a BRAC site can be quite different from that 
at a private brownfield site."29 BRAC sites, by law, have multiple state 
and federal agencies overseeing the cleanup. While the DoD has been 
given the authority to lead cleanups at BRAC sites, other agencies, in-
cluding the EPA, are involved.30 Remediation at brownfields sites, by 
contrast, is typically overseen by one state agency, or even none at all in 
those states that allow consultant-led cleanups.31 
Given all these differences, one might wonder why our panel's 
discussion of brownfields and BRAC was so harmonious. The answer is 
not difficult to discern. The BRAC process has a number of safeguards in 
place with respect to public participation, cleanup standards, and cleanup 
oversight. However imperfect these safeguards might be (and no one 
would argue that BRAC cleanups have been perfect), they are intended to 
ensure that cleanups of sites being transferred are sufficiently protective 
of those who will use the sites in the future. 
2s Id. 
26 Id. at 28, 64. 
27 Id.; see also Carolyn M. White, Senior Envtl. Counsel, Air Force Office of General 
Counsel, Environmental Considerations in Real Property Transactions, Presentation at 
the William & Mary Envtl. Law and Pol'y Rev. Symposium: Mission Impossible?: The 
Compatibility of Military and Environmental Goals 16 (Feb. 10, 2007) (notes on file with 
author). 
2s Id. 
29 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 25. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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From the perspective of an observer and frequent critic of 
brownfields programs, much of what is built formally into the BRAC pro-
gram seemed appealing. I have written about drawbacks ofbrownfields 
programs in three areas: the lack of public participation in fundamental 
decisions affecting the future of individual brownfields sites and 
community land use planning generally; the relaxation of cleanup stan-
dards in the name of getting sites back into commerce more quickly; and 
the relative lack of oversight in state VCPs.32 By contrast, as I describe 
below, BRAC's environmental safeguards often look more desirable than 
those of state VCPs. At times, I was surprised to find that they even 
compare favorably to substantive features I have recommended that 
states incorporate in their brownfield programs.33 
That, I suppose, was what led friends and colleagues familiar with 
my work to suggest that I look to BRAC for exemplars of what might 
work elsewhere. This leads us to a sort of irony, though. As I have come 
to realize that BRAC might offer constructive lessons for those adminis-
tering state VCPs, the nature of BRAC environmental remediation itself 
is changing. Over the course of the five BRAC rounds, and particularly 
in the fifth round of closings, the BRAC process has moved to become 
more "brownfields-like."34 The process has begun to adopt the flexibility 
and methodologies ofVCPs, to the extent practicable within the statutory 
and regulatory framework that governs BRAC. According to a number of 
commentators, this creates opportunities for getting sites back into 
commerce more quickly than has been the case in the first four BRAC 
rounds. If a cleanup at a BRAC site is administered with a major role 
played by a state agency, it is not much different conceptually from a clean-
up at a private site remediated in a state VCP. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN BRAC AND THE THREE 
"SURPRISES" 
So while I found the surprises of looking at BRAC to be mostly 
positive, I also found that the fifth BRAC round might pose the same 
sorts of dilemmas that have been present in brownfields remediation and 
32 See generally Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21; see also Joel B. Eisen, 
Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL 'y F. 187 (1998) 
[hereinafter Eisen, Sustainable Cities]. 
33 See Eisen, Sustainable Cities, supra note 32, at 215-19. 
34 ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 1-2; U.S. Air Force BRAC Q&A, http://www 
.af.mil/brac/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
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reuse since the 1990s. That contrapuntal thinking about the evolution of 
BRAC led me to split my analysis of its features into two parts. In 
sections A and B of this Part, I examine two largely positive attributes 
of BRAC: its insistence on comprehensive remedial action and its 
structure emphasizing public participation. In section C, I offer a pre-
liminary analysis of the increased use of more "brownfields-like" cleanup 
procedures in BRAC and consider this to be a more mixed development. 
A. "Clean Means Clean" 
A definite positive surprise in the BRAC program is that at BRAC 
sites there is a preference for finality of remedial action. The touchstone 
for a BRAC cleanup is the statutory commitment embodied in CERCLA 
§ 120(h), where "clean means clean," with strong coordinated multi-
jurisdictional and multi-agency oversight to ensure proper cleanup. In 
particular, CERCLA § 120(h)(3) requires the DoD to ensure that "all 
remedial action necessary to protect human health and the environment 
with respect to any [hazardous] substance remaining on the property has 
been taken before the date of such transfer. "35 The deed transferring title 
is required to list hazardous substances that were present on the 
property and remedial actions (if any) taken to address them. 36 The 
BRRM states that "[w]henever a Military Department enters into a 
transfer ofreal property outside the Federal government where CERCLA 
120(h)(3) ... hazardous substances were stored for 1 year or longer, 
known to have been released, or disposed of, Section 120(h) of CERCLA 
... applies, [and that,] "[t]he Department of Defense has no authority 
under Section 120(h) ... to increase or decrease the commitment required 
by that section."37 
If remediation activities are required, the statutory commitment 
to cleanup leads the DoD to follow a rigorous process for investigation 
and cleanup whether or not the site is listed on the NPL, as described in 
the BRRM.38 As one commentator notes, "the structure and process set 
forth in the NCP for environmental remediation are applicable to all 
DERP sites regardless ofNPL status."39 The cleanup process follows the 
35 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2000). 
36 White, supra note 27, at 18. 
37 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.2.l. 
38 See id. § C8.5.4. 
39 Moeller, supra note 3, at 910. 
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normal multi-step process, that is, from Preliminary Assessment/Site 
Inspection through Record of Decision, for cleanups conducted under the 
NCP (or under RCRA procedures if appropriate, as spelled out in the 
BRRM).40 In contrast to the normal process for privately-owned sites 
being remediated under CERCLA, the DoD (not the EPA or a state environ-
mental agency) has lead authority under Executive Order 12,580 to conduct 
the cleanup of a BRAC site, with the EPA's signoffrequired on selection 
ofremedies for those BRAC sites that are also on the NPL.41 The cleanup 
is conducted in accordance not only with CERCLA or RCRA, but also 
with a whole host of other state and federal environmental laws.42 
In a "standard" transfer all remediation activities are completed 
prior to the transfer of the military facility to the private sector. The deed 
must contain a covenant that "all remedial action necessary to protect 
human health and the environment ... has been taken [prior to] transfer," 
and a covenant that any additional remedial action found to be necessary 
after transfer will be conducted by the federal government.43 As one 
commentator notes, this shows that "Congress did not want the federal 
government to offload the costs of addressing contamination for which it 
was responsible onto private parties that may not have the resources to 
undertake proper cleanup."44 
In the fifth BRAC round, the baseline report on existing environ-
mental conditions at a particular site is an "Environmental Condition of 
Property" ("ECP") report which includes data on the environmental 
history of the facility. 45 As the BRRM states, "[t]he Military Department 
40 See BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.2.3. 
41 Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 29, 1987); White, supra note 27, at 16. 
42 Exec. Order No. 12,580. Federal environmental laws governing the transfer of military 
sites to private parties include the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the 
National Historic Preservation Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, and Endangered 
Species Act, among others. BRRM, supra note 10 §§ C8.2, C8.4; White, supra note 27, at 
14. NEPA compliance is a key component of the BRAC process, as spelled out in the 
BRRM. BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.2. A table summarizing the various laws that govern 
cleanups may be found in ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 25-28. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii) (2000); see also White, supra note 27, at 18. 
44 Goodwin Proctor LLP, Next Round of Base Closures Offers New Brownfield 
Redevelopment Opportunities, ENVTL. L. ADVISORY 4, Aug. 2004, available at www 
.goodwinprocter.com/-/media/FAODC812A12F4D2F9DB7185BE1572AB2.ashx. 
45 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3; ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, 
at 6. While the ECP is not intended to meet the requirements of the "All Appropriate 
Inquiries" rule detailing what purchasers of real property must do to avert potential 
liability under CERCLA, it is meant to "[a]ssist prospective new owners in meeting the 
[rule's] requirements." BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3.l.6. 
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with real property accountability shall assess, determine, and document 
the environmental condition of all transferable property in an ECP 
report."46 There are multiple purposes of the ECP report, including 
"[p]rovid[ing] the Military Department with information it may use to make 
disposal decisions regarding the property" and "[p]rovid[ing] the public 
with information relative to the environmental condition of the property.'747 
The BRRM outlines the steps in the BRAC cleanup process from 
that point forwa:r:d. As in the case of private sector sites investigated 
under CERCLA, it may be the case that no further action is required, or 
it may be that a cleanup may be required, depending on the site's 
condition. 48 In the first four BRAC rounds, most cleanups were led by 
BRAC Cleanup Teams ("BCTs") consisting of EPA, DoD and state 
officials, 49 but the leadership team structure has been modified for the 
fifth BRAC round. 50 
Both the EPA and the DoD have responsibilities for specific 
remediation activities.51 A detailed Memorandum of Understanding 
between the EPA and the DoD spells out the responsibilities of each for 
BRAC site cleanups.52 One EPA task, besides signoff on remedies for 
BRAC sites also on the NPL, is "[c]ertifying that remedies are working 
as they were intended at all sites when remedial actions are complete 
(known as 'operating properly and successfully').''53 This "OPS demon-
stration," meets the requirements of CERCLA § 120(h)(3) "if the 
46 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.3.l. 
47 Id. §§ C8.3.l.1, C8.3.l.2. 
48 Id. § CB.5.4. 
49 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 13. 
50 Id. ("According to the BRRM, BCTs will not be created at the BRAC 2005 installations. 
At many installations, working relationships are already established between DoD 
personnel and federal and State regulators. This is the case at facilities where the EPA 
Remedial Project Manager, DoD personnel and state personnel already work together on 
cleanup decisions. Section [C]8.5.6 of the BRRM states, 'Existing procedures and 
relationships related to regulatory oversight should be maintained for closing installations 
when they facilitate cleanup and redevelopment, and until the property is transferred to 
the new owner.' These working relationships do facilitate cleanup, and therefore should 
continue throughout the BRAC process to address cleanup and property transfer issues."). 
51 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, Property 
Transfer at Federal Facilities, available athttp://www.epa.gov/fedfadpdf/baseclosure. pdf. 
52 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & U.S. Dep't of Defense, Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense, 
EPA Reference PW97922127-01-0, (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedfadpdf/ 
brac_mou. pdf. 
53 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Property Transfer at Federal Facilities, supra note 51, at 3. 
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construction and installation of an approved remedial design has been 
completed, and the remedy has been demonstrated to the [EPA] 
Administrator to be operating properly and successfully."54 The EPA's 
approval of an OPS demonstration does not imply that all remedial action 
has been completed, but only that transfer may take place, for the 
completion of remedial activities "is defined by the attainment of specific 
cleanup levels or performance goals that are specified in a decision 
document, such as a ROD."55 
An important step in the transfer or lease of a BRAC site is a 
Finding of Suitability to Transfer (or Lease) ("FOST" or "FOSL"). This 
document, prepared at the conclusion of the process, "state [s] the 
property is environmentally suitable for transfer or lease and contain[s] 
a description of any long-term remedies (including land-use controls) and 
responsibilities for their maintenance and reporting. "56 This document 
certifies that CERCLA § 120(h)(3) has been complied with and that all 
remedial actions have been taken, the CERCLA covenants have been 
met, and the property is suitable for transfer or lease.57 
A new mechanism allows so-called "early transfer," or a transfer 
before all remedial activities are completed. 58 In that case the DoD prepares 
a Covenant Deferral RequestJFinding of Suitability for Early Transfer 
("FOSET"): request for early transfer, under CERCLA § 120(h)(3) as 
amended. 59 This will be covered in more detail below, as it is a critical 
element ofBRAC's transformation into a more "brownfields-like" system. 
As the BRAC cleanup and transfer process is spelled out in this 
comprehensive fashion in the BRRM, following the mandates of existing 
state and federal environmental laws, there is a resulting relative 
uniformity in the cleanup approach. What is also familiar, then, are the 
imperfections that have dogged the CERCLA cleanup process at private 
sector sites since the advent of CERCLA, including delays and cost 
overruns.6° Cleanups can be delayed, particularly at BRAC NPL sites, 
54 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(B) (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
SITE CLOSEOUT PROCESS GUIDE§ 6.1 (1999) [hereinafter DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/fedfadpdf/site_closeout.pdf. 
55 DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE, supra note 54, § 6.1. 
56 BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5.5.l. 
51 Id. 
58 Id. § C5.6.3.l. 
59 Id. § C5.5.5.3. 
60 AsS'NOFSTATE&TERRITORIALSOLIDWASTEMGMT.0FFICIALS,POLICYPOSITIONPAPER 
ON THE MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter 
ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER], available at http://www.astswmo.org/files/publications/ 
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and a recent analysis by the EPA's Office of Federal Facilities Restora-
tion and Reuse notes that thirty-four sites are still on the NPL. 61 
The remediation process compares favorably to that of state VCPs 
in that it retains a commitment to full cleanups. As the BRAC process 
becomes more "brownfields-like," this may be a difference without a 
distinction, but at least in its statutory and regulatory machinery BRAC 
requires a more thorough remediation process than does the typical state 
VCP. The formal commitment, however, may not be all that important, 
as borne out by BRAC cleanups that fall short of the ideal. As the 
Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials 
(" ASTSWMO") notes, the "DoD has shown an increased reliance on 
institutional controls as the primary remedy or as a major component in 
the overall remedies at BRAC sites," and while "[i]nstitutional controls 
are initially lower in cost as compared to more permanent remedies ... 
[they] should not be the sole component of any final remedy."62 The 
ASTSWMO cautions that "[s]tate experiences with institutional controls 
suggest that permanent remedies are more effective and potentially less 
expensive over time than high maintenance remedies based predomi-
nantly on institutional controls."63 
There is another respect in which the BRAC process can inform 
the state brownfields process: through its feature of a post-cleanup 
obligation. The DoD is required under CERCLA to perform more cleanup 
than was completed before the transfer of the site when additional 
contamination is discovered, when the selected remedy failed to perform 
as expected, or when an institutional control proved ineffective. 64 
Unfortunately, this may not be the panacea for remedying problems that 
are not addressed in the initial remediation process. As one commentator 
notes, "under a worst-case scenario, it may be difficult to make the DoD 
component return to complete remediation where they are no longer 
owners [of sites] ."65 
However effective the post-cleanup obligation might be, it stands 
in contrast to the situation in state VCPs, where there is typically no 
federalfacilities/Final%20April%202006%20BRAC%20position%20paper.pdf. 
61 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office, Mid-Year 
2007 BRAC Program Snapshot, http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/brac2007 .htm#5 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
62 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 5. 
63 Id. 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(iii) (2000). 
65 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 24. 
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such requirement. Indeed, more than one commentator has suggested 
that a drawback of VCPs is their insufficient attention to the future. 66 
With states strapped for resources to oversee ongoing cleanups, it is 
unlikely that they would devote much vigor to checking back on those 
sites which have already had what the states believed were successful 
outcomes. This may turn out to be unsound, as the cleanup at a brownfields 
site may fall short if all existing contamination at sites was not discov-
ered prior to their reuse (particularly if a developer uses institutional 
controls rather than performing a cleanup), or if sites that have been 
processed through the programs are contaminated again at a later date. 
Neither situation is typically addressed in state VCPs. Most state laws 
have "reopener" features but evidence to date suggests that states do not 
use them to perform oversight of sites that have been processed through 
the programs. 67 
B. A Model of Public Participation? 
In the early 1990s, when I began writing about brownfields law 
and policy, some well-meaning friends and colleagues suggested that I 
look to base closings as a model. At first, I was taken aback by the unusual 
notion that any military process could stand as a model of public partici-
pation. And yet, it turns out that a vital component of DoD cleanup 
activities at BRAC sites is coordination with local stakeholders. The 
primary vehicle for this is the Restoration Advisory Board ("RAB"), 
combined with the availability of funds for training local residents to 
become active public participants under contracts from the Technical 
Assistance for Public Participation ("TAPP") program.68 The purpose of 
TAPP is to provide "support for independent technical advice to assist in 
clarifying specific scientific and engineering issues that arise when review-
ing restoration activities and documents."69 There is nothing comparable 
in most state VCPs to help ordinary citizens understand the complexities 
of environmental remediation. 
66 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 732 (citing Professor David Dana). 
67 Id. at 746. 
68 U.S.DEP'TOFDEFENSE,DEFENSEENVIRONMENTALRESTORATIONPROGRAMFISCAL YEAR 
2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS App. 0, 0-6 [hereinafter DoD, DERP ANNUAL 
REPORT 2006], available at https://www .denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/OSD/DEP2006/ 
App_ O _Restoration-Advisory-Boards_osd-draft. pdf. Appendix 0 details the TAPP process 
and provides a list of groups receiving TAPP grants. 
69 Id. 
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As the name implies, the RAB is an entity formed to advise the 
DoD on decisions involving the closing and transfer of the facility and is 
meant to be a "continuous forum through which members of affected com-
munities can provide input to an installation's ongoing environmental 
restoration activities."70 The RAB is established under statutes and 
regulations governing the BRAC process. 71 The DoD rule, last updated 
in 2006, 72 spells out the circumstances under which a RAB should be 
established. The rule states that "[a] RAB should be established when 
there is "sufficient and sustained community interest," and any of the fol-
lowing conditions are met: "(1) [t]he closure of the facility [with] a transfer 
of property to the community, (2) [a]t least 50 local citizens petition ... 
[the facility to create a RAB], (3) [flederal, state, tribal, or local govern-
ment representatives request ... [it], or (4) the installation determines the 
need for RAB."73 Once a RAB is established, it usually includes represen-
tatives of the facility, local governments, the EPA, and citizens.74 Its 
proceedings are open to the public, with the facility maintaining an 
Administrative Record for public review.75 
There have been some disagreements in situations where commu-
nity members thought RABs should have been established but were not. 
This led some commentators to the 2006 RAB rule update to observe that 
requiring fifty citizens to petition for a RAB was an onerous burden.76 
The DoD disagreed and maintained the requirement as is. 77 In any event, 
the situation where residents seek to have a RAB but are rebuffed is the 
exception, not the rule, as there are about 310 RABs in operation.78 
70 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17. See also BRRM, supra 
note 10, § C8.5.l.5 ("RABs bring together people who reflect the diverse interests within 
the local community, enabling the early and continued flow of information among the 
affected community, DoD, and environmental oversight agencies."). 
71 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)(2)(A) (2000). 
72 Department of Defense Restoration Advisory Boards, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,610 (May 12, 
2006) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2006)). A number oflingering issues were addressed 
in the 2006 rule update, including criteria for establishment of a RAB, its composition, 
and logistics (meetings, adjournment, etc.). Id. 
73 32 C.F.R. § 202.2(a) (2006). 
74 Id. § 202.4(a). 
75 Id. §§ 202.9(a), 202.11, 202.14. 
76 See 71 Fed. Reg. at 27,612. 
77 Id. ("The Department clarifies that 50 petitioners is not the only way to establish a RAB. 
The petition is one of four proposed mechanisms to initiate the establishment of the RAB."). 
78 DoD, DERP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 68, at 0-2; ASTSWMO, BRAC 
REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 17. 
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RABs have added value to the BRAC process. A survey conducted 
by ASTSWMO found that twenty-nine out of thirty-one state environ-
mental agencies viewed RABs as a positive influence.79 In this respect, 
the BRAC process compares quite favorably to public participation in state 
VCPs. In the two decades since the advent of state brownfields programs, 
there has been a substantial shift in the level of public participation in 
remediation and reuse decisions.so Many statutes enacted in what one 
might term the "first generation" of brownfields laws did not establish 
mandatory requirements to involve the public in such basic decisions as 
determining the future uses to which sites would be put, preferring 
instead to leave these decisions within developers' control.s1 One apparent 
reason for this was that states intended to signal that developers who vol-
unteered to remediate and reuse sites should face less bureaucratic red 
tape than if they were enmeshed in enforcement-driven situations. Since 
then, developers who are dotting the i's and crossing the t's do more to 
involve the public, often more than is required under state VCP procedures. 
However, there are still fundamental differences between public 
input in state VCPs and BRAC. First is the requirement that an advisory 
board be formed when citizens request it. This concept is not completely 
absent from state VCPs, as some states do have mechanisms for forming 
advisory board-like structures to advise site developers and state regulators 
(and some boards are of course formed on an ad hoc basis). Still, the 
majority of states do not require developers to consult with community-
based entities.s2 Also, the requirement that the military give "careful 
consideration" to the advice of RABs (which may include recommenda-
tions on the future use of a military facility)s3 is unheard of in state 
VCPs, where the site developers typically come to the states after having 
developed their plans for the sites.s4 This is an important distinction 
between the two types of programs. Local residents naturally expect that 
their input will drive decisions about site use, and are often surprised to 
79 Ass'n of State & Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt. Officials, Community Involvement: 
Working Together to Achieve Results (2007), available at http://www.astswmo.org/files/ 
publications/federalfacilities/Communi ty Involvement W ebversion. pdf. 
80 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 753. 
81 See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?": Challenges and Limits of 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883 (1996) [hereinafter 
Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?'1. 
82 Id. at 1004-05. 
83 32 C.F.R. § 202.l(a)(3) (2006). 
84 See Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?", supra note 81, at 1003-04. 
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find out that most VCPs do not give them a voice in this critical aspect 
of the process. By contrast, the DoD's report on RABs notes that over one 
hundred RABs advised the military on the future use of BRAC sites.85 
Local residents are almost always represented on RABs.86 So too 
are residents of the affected base, local environmental groups, members 
of the local business community, low-income and minority groups, and 
local government officials.87 This broad-based participation is a signifi-
cant factor in the appeal ofRABs as community sounding boards. As the 
ASTSWMO has found, "since the inception of the BRAC program, DoD's 
emphasis on stakeholder involvement through the formation of BCTs 
and RABs has generally been successful and has contributed to expedit-
ing environmental cleanups and helped build community support for the 
BRAC process."88 
There simply is no comparable requirement in state VCP pro-
cedures to draw upon advice from a broad spectrum of the affected 
community. If the states established boards of this sort at brownfields 
sites, particularly larger sites that have impacts on entire communities, 
the resulting decision making might be more in keeping with community 
visions for urban redevelopment. That in turn, as I have stated elsewhere, 
is an essential element in achieving sustainability through brownfields 
reuse and redevelopment.89 This is no doubt a positive surprise emerging 
from the comparison between public participation in BRAC and state VCPs. 
C. The Process Is Becoming More "Brownfields-Like" (Increasing 
Flexibility in Cleanups Through the Use of ETA) 
While the BRAC process has been a highly competent means of 
balancing private sector interests and environmental protection, BRAC 
cleanups in the fifth round are evolving and becoming more "brownfields-
like," with developers seeking cleanup processes that have more of the 
perceived flexibility inherent in VCPs. As the ASTSWMO notes, "[i]t is 
anticipated that early transfer/privatization of contaminated parcels will 
85 DOD, DERP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 68, at 0-6. 
86 Id. at 0-5 (305 out of 312 RABs in FY 2006 reported having members from the local 
community and even the other seven might have local residents because they could be 
counted in other categories). 
87 Id. (citing Figure 0-8). 
88 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1. 
89 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 753-55 (citations omitted); Eisen, 
Sustainable Cities, supra note 32. 
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be the norm as DoD attempts to quickly transfer BRAC properties."90 
This final "surprise" is a more mixed one in its potential impacts for 
environmental protection. 
Since its enactment, CERCLA §120(h)(3) has been amended to 
allow early transfer of a BRAC site under certain circumstances before 
all required remedial action has been completed, under the process 
known as "Early Transfer Authority."91 Under early transfer agreements 
("ETA"), the statutory mandate for a complete cleanup remains but the 
private sector takes on more responsibility for remediation activities 
(particularly in a transferee-led cleanup).92 CERCLA § 120(h)(3)(C) 
allows federal agencies to transfer property before all necessary cleanup 
actions have been taken. 93 The ETA is a deferral of the CE RC LA covenants, 
and the Covenant Deferral Request/ Finding of Suitability for Early 
Transfer ("FOSET") requires approval from the EPA and from state 
governmental authorities. 94 The DoD is still required to issue the covenant 
required under CERCLA that "all remedial action[s] necessary to protect 
human health and the environment ... [have] been taken," but in an early 
transfer situation the timing of issuance of this covenant changes.95 
ETA has been used at a small minority ofBRAC sites to date.96 In 
the standard cleanup and transfer model, as noted above, the DoD does 
the cleanup itself under the procedures spelled out in the NCP.97 In the 
ETA model, options for cleanup activities can be selected in part on the 
basis of which party is best qualified to perform them.98 The model can 
be more like the standard transfer, with the DoD performing cleanup 
work and the transferee focusing on redevelopment activities, or the DoD 
and transferee can share cleanup work.99 At the cleanup of the Mare 
Island Naval Shipyard in California, for example, the DoD focused on 
90 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1. 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C) (2000). 
92 See BRRM, supra note 10, § C8.5. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C). 
94 See BRRM, supra note 10, § C5.5.5.3. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I). 
96 See Victor Wieszek, Office of the Deputy Under Sec'y of Def., Early Transfer Authority: 
Background and Use for BRAC Rounds 1-V, Remarks at the Joint Services Environmental 
Management Conference and Exhibition 7 (Mar. 2006) (Power Point presentation 
available athttp://proceedings.ndia.org/JSEM2006/W ednesday/Wieszek. pelf) (noting that 
ETA has been used at twenty-one BRAC sites). 
97 See id. at 5. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
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military-specific cleanup issues and left addressing other contamina-
tion in the hands of the LRA. 100 
In a purely privatized cleanup, the DoD would transfer title early 
to the LRA, before any cleanup activities had been completed.101 According 
to the ASTSWMO, it "can be a very successful tool to transfer property 
because it accelerates remediation, and advances economic development of 
an area. It also removes the DoD component as an impediment to cleanup 
to state standards, because the new owner agrees, in the Consent 
Agreement, to cleanup to state standards."102 This recognizes that the 
private party may do cleanup more efficiently than the government, as 
it might have more expertise in environmental remediation, and could 
retain its own remediation contractor and have more control over the 
process. The LRA may have an existing relationship with state regula-
tors, which may in theory help move the remediation activities along 
more expeditiously.103 Perhaps the most important reason advanced for 
privatized transfers is the "one dig" principle: integrating cleanup and 
redevelopment would allow the LRA to perform all of this work at the 
site at the same time.104 
A notable example of a site that has proceeded to cleanup and 
reuse under a privatization model is the Oakland Army Base in Oakland, 
California.105 This base was located on the Oakland waterfront just south 
of the eastern entrance to the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Accord-
ing to a historical source, "[i]ts mission was to ship the Army's men and 
material into the Pacific areas of operation [in World War II and d]uring 
the war tens of thousands of soldiers and 25 million tons of supplies 
100 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, SUCCESSFUL PuBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AT FORMER 
MAREISLANDNAVALSHIPYARD(2006),auailableathttp://deparc.egovservices.net/depard 
pdfs/stories/N avy/BRAC_Mare_Island_N avy _Success_Story _10-16-06. pdf (providing a 
detailed description of Mare Island cleanup activities); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., 
DEFENSEENVIRONMENTALRESTORATIONPROGRAMFISCAL YEAR1998ANNUALREPORTTO 
CONGRESS app. A, at 124, available at https://www.denix.osd.miVdenix/PublidLibrary/ 
Cleanup/CleanupOfdardReports/FY1998/app_a/marei_124.pdf(providing a timeline of 
the cleanup at Mare Island). 
101 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 20. 
102 Id. at 24. 
103 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that one environmental consideration that 
influences the merits of using ETA is the relationship between the LRA and state 
environmental regulators). 
104 See ITRC, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 5; Wieszek, supra note 96, at 3. 
105 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 9; City of Oakland, Site Information, Reports & 
Analysis,httpJ/www.oaklandnet.com/government/obra/hp.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
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flowed through this terminal."106 After World War II, it functioned as "a 
major distribution point for war surplus material."107 In 1995, it was 
designated for closure in the fourth BRAC round. 108 
In 2000, the appropriate LRA, the "Oakland Base Reuse Author-
ity" ("OBRA"), requested a conveyance using the ETA procedure, so new 
owners of the site could integrate cleanup and redevelopment.109 The 
OBRA developed a reuse plan in 2002 that involved dividing the site 
between the Oakland Redevelopment Agency (which would receive a 
conveyance from the OBRA) and the Port of Oakland.110 The part of the 
site deeded to the Redevelopment Agency would be turned into a 
"Gateway Development Area."111 Under this reuse plan, the Army trans-
ferred 364 acres of base property to the City of Oakland in August 2003.112 
The California Department of Toxic Substances Control is the lead 
agency for base environmental restoration. 113 Cleanup is taking place 
under a Remedial Action Plan ("RAP") and Risk Management Plan 
("RMP"), as specified in California's brownfields laws, with site cleanups 
to be completed within five years of the transfer (that is, by 2008).114 The 
Army retained a small parcel of about thirteen acres that was intended 
for transfer to the Department of Interior for use as a park. 115 
The Oakland Army Base transfer has been described as an 
"[i]nnovative application of brownfield redevelopment approach at a 
closed military facility [and the f]irst of its kind for the U.S. Army BRAC 
106 California State Military Museum, Oakland Army Base,http://www.militarymuseum.org/ 
OaklandArmyBase.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
101 Id. 
rns Id. 
109 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FINDING OF SUITABILITY FOR EARLY TRANSFER FOR OAKLAND 
ARMY BASE 8 (2003), available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/obra/foset/ 
FOSET-FINAL_SIGNED_APR-03.pdf. 
110 OAKLAND BASE REUSE AUTHORITY, OAKLAND ARMY BASE FINAL REUSE PLAN 2 (2002), 
available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/obra/obrafrp. pdf. 
111 Id. at 3. 
112 California Department of Toxic Substances Control, supra note 6. 
113 Id. 
114 See id.; OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE 
STUDY: OAKLAND ARMY BASE-REMEDIATION AND REUSE 16 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEF'T 
OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE STUDY], available at http://www.oea.gov/oeaweb.nsf/ 
Clough. pdf. 
115 See ERLER & KALINOWSKI, INC., DRAFT REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN FOR OAKLAND ARMY 
BASE 1-2, available at http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/ceda/revised/planningzoning/ 
MajorProjectsSection/RAP/Text/Text.pdf; California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control, supra note 6. 
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Program."116 One commentator identifies two significant benefits from the 
early transfer through use of a FOSET and remedial action in California's 
state brownfields program: (1) "[a] [c]lose working relationship with 
DTSC staff-[i]ncluding jointly edited documents and working group 
sessions[; and (2)] [i]ncorporation of significant local community support 
for brownfield redevelopment under the City of Oakland's Urban Land 
Redevelopment Program."117 This suggests that the purported administra-
tive efficiencies of remediating BRAC sites under the auspices of a state 
program may in fact have been present in this case. 
Yet, overall, there have been relatively few privatized cleanups to 
date, reflecting the complexity of handing off remediation activities while 
ensuring that the CERCLA covenants will be met. 118 As has been noted, 
"[s]uccessful implementation of [ETA] requires that the DoD, the pur-
chaser, the community, and the regulatory agencies work very closely 
together. Not only is this partnership in the spirit of the BRAC process, 
but it is mandated by statute."119 
As the trend toward privatization is likely to continue, 120 it is 
worth paying attention to its potential environmental consequences. 
Because the process would devolve considerable responsibility for cleanups 
to the private sector, with oversight by the states, it is subject to the 
same drawbacks that I have identified previously with state VCPs. As 
with VCPs, the end result will require vigilance by state agencies that 
they may not be fully equipped to carry out. The ASTSWMO cautions 
that "[t]his [privatization] approach will directly impact State regulatory 
agencies, as it will require additional oversight and State resources."121 
This could lead to problems in the long run if, as I have observed else-
where, 122 states tend to devote fewer resources to their brownfields programs 
than might be necessary to ensure that cleanups remain protective after 
they are completed. 
116 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., BROWNFIELD CASE STUDY, supra note 114, at 19. 
117 Id. at 20. 
118 See Wieszek, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that "ETA is not appropriate for all 
properties" and listing considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether to use 
the authority). 
119 DOD, SITE CLOSEOUT GUIDE, supra note 54, § 6.2. 
120 ASTSWMO, BRAC REGULATOR'S GUIDE, supra note 17, at 1 ("BRAC 2005 cleanups 
will be more focused toward privatization and Performance Based Contracts, which likely 
means additional State regulatory oversight."). 
121 ASTSWMO, POSITION PAPER, supra note 60, at 1. 
122 See Eisen, Brownfi.elds at 20, supra note 21, at 735-37 (citations omitted). 
424 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL 'y REV. [Vol. 32:403 
More specifically, some substantive concerns would linger. If a 
cleanup is done assuming land uses as specified in the LRA's land use 
plan, there should be some assurance that additional remediation will 
take place if land uses change over time. As the ASTSWMO states, "[a 
BRAC] clean up to restricted use must include the future liabilities ... 
should land use change."123 But that sort of long-run vigilance is not a 
strong suit of state brownfields programs at present, nor, for that matter, 
is long-term monitoring to ensure that land use controls are appropri-
ately working. 124 In the words of one observer, "any policy that supports 
restricted uses must also address the full range of issues involving land 
use controls including the implementability and enforceability of [land 
use controls]. "125 Again, leaving that in the hands of state brownfields 
programs makes an assumption about long-term efficacy that has yet to 
be proven. 126 
Another potential problem inheres in the notion that in a 
privatized cleanup the new property owner might take on the cleanup 
actions, but in the final instance "CERCLA liability remains with DoD 
[and a]reas of additional contamination discovered after the property 
transfer would still be the responsibility ofDoD."127 Unfortunately, this re-
opener (the same one based on CERCLA § 120(h)(3) as discussed above) 
may be even less useful than it would be in "standard" cleanups and trans-
fers, as one commentator notes that "[t]he downside is that the DoD 
component is no longer the owner of the property."128 This would make 
it especially difficult to make the DoD return to the site and either super-
vise or conduct additional remedial activities, as the military would no 
longer have ownership of the property.129 
So privatization may be the frontier ofBRAC cleanups, but for me 
it raises many of the same red flags as do brownfields cleanups. Brown-
fields cleanups are here to stay, of course, so it is no surprise that the 
BRAC process is moving in this direction. It is too soon, however, to tell 
whether BRAC sites will turn out to be just like other brownfields sites, 
and any thoughts I might have about that (besides the programmatic 
concerns I have expressed about state VCPs generally) would be 
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124 See Eisen, Brownfields at 20, supra note 21, at 735-37 (citations omitted). 
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128 Id. at 24. 
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conjectural at this point. Still, I wonder, given the larger size and 
complexity of the typical BRAC site compared to brownfields sites, ifthe 
potential problems might even be exacerbated. Time will tell, and so at 
this point I am wary and can only view this "surprise" (the trend toward 
increased privatization) as a mixed blessing. 
CONCLUSION 
The "surprise" of our panel presentation was that the BRAC 
process, with its complex mechanisms for environmental remediation, 
can offer lessons for state brownfields officials in the critical areas of 
public participation and cleanup process and oversight. Because many 
BRAC sites are complex and have required considerable effort by a 
number of stakeholders working together to achieve effective environ-
mental remediation, there is a lengthy track record that may not always 
adhere to the statutory and regulatory ideals. Nevertheless, it can be 
said that BRAC cleanups at least strive toward an ideal that is not 
required in any state VCP. 
At the same time, though, as BRAC cleanups are becoming more 
state VCP-like (that is, with more use of ETA and ''brownfields-like" 
methods), challenges about finality of remedial action and long-run 
oversight will enter more into the BRAC process. We will have to revisit 
this evolution of the BRAC process in its fifth round as sites are being 
remediated and transferred to the private sector, and, in particular, we 
will have to monitor whether state regulators devote the resources 
necessary to ensure that the sites being transferred are completely safe. 
Although it is too soon to tell whether this experimentation will yield 
productive results, it is almost certain to lead to a different model of 
interaction between the military and the private sector, one which bears 
watching in the future. 

